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COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF TERROR:
A SPECIALIZED JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY
Marshall S. Shapo*

I. A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY
The attacks of September 11 pose challenges to what I have called
our jurisprudence of injury:' a comprehensive, if loosely defined system
of law that includes tort, compensation statutes and regulation. The basic
tort features of the events are clear. The primary wrongdoers were
intentional tortfeasors, of whom the operational villains are dead and
their managers as a practical matter unreachable, unless the attacks
eventually come to be tied to a government.
One could ascribe negligence to a number of secondary actors in
the American private sector and also to the government. Although one
may reasonably predict that any negligence of the government would be
immunized by the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort
Claims Act,2 this asserted negligence would provide a policy basis for
the funding provided by the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund
of 2001 ("Fund").3 Further fleshing out the broad spectrum of the
jurisprudence of injury, the Fund itself represents, in an extraordinarily
complex way, the sort of compensation system that has been primarily
associated with workers' compensation. Finally, various regulatory and
quasi-regulation issues swirl around the subject after the fact, notably the

* Frederic P. Vose Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. This paper was
originally delivered at the Conference on the Law and Economics of Providing Compensation for
Harm Caused by Terrorism, held in April 2002 at the Georgetown University Law Center.
1. See generally ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM, TOwARDS A
JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN
AMERICAN TORT LAW (1984) [hereinafter JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY].

2. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000).
3. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§ 401409, 115 Stat. 230, 237-41 (2001) [hereinafter Air Safety Act].
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question of how much the government should be involved in providing
security against terrorists-in this case, airport security.
Complicating the analysis is what I have called, in another
connection, the Problem of the Missing Tsar.4 Ideally, we might desire a
sovereign who would make decisions on both an overall basis and a dayto-day basis about how the consequences of personal injuries are to be
allocated among various social institutions. It is true that all of our
traditions-philosophical as well as practical-militate against having a
Tsar. What is striking about the legislation setting up the Fund, however,
is that, in fact we have created a sub-Tsar for the event: the Special
Master!
A global challenge to a targeted fund of this sort inheres in the
compassionate desire to create a comprehensive umbrella for a wide
range of misfortunes. At the other pole is the instinct to decentralize the
allocation of injury costs as much as possible to those who cause
injuries, and, where they have any responsibility for injuries, to the
victims. Thus, our desire for large public policy solutions, of which the
most comprehensive injury compensation plan on the planet is the New
Zealand solution,6 is forever at war with a highly focused tort way of
doing things.7 The events of September 11 put these philosophical issues
to a grisly test.
This Article focuses on the Fund, which is one title of a broader
statute, the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act.' I
shall be commenting on what Congress may have been thinking when it
hurriedly passed this legislation, which is dated just eleven days after the
horrific events in question. And I shall suggest some other
rationalizations for this unique statute, including its specific combination
of wealth transfers and liability limitations.

II.

THE EVENTS

Let us briefly rehearse the facts of September 11 as they would
appear in the narrow terms of the common law. The events in question
arose out of a carefully planned set of intentional torts. Persons who
4. See Marshall S. Shapo, Tort Reform: The Problem of the Missing Tsar, 19 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 185, 185 (1990).
5. See Air Safety Act, supra note 3, § 404(a).
6. For a summary by a knowledgeable observer, see Sir Geoffrey Palmer, The New Zealand
Experience, 15 U. HAWAII L. REV. 604 (1993).
7. See, e.g., JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 10-187-10-192 (summarizing the
relationship of tort to other systems of compensation and regulation).
8. See Air Safety Act, supra note 3, §§ 401-409.
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were literally troglodytes, halfway around the world, conceived a
massive series of trespasses and batteries with the purpose of inflicting
emotional distress not only on victims but on the nation as a whole. As
this is written, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that there may be
some involvement of actual governments, in addition to unofficial
organizations, in these events. If that were the case, there would be a
potential to impose an international form of tort liability against those
governments9 as well as, theoretically, against individuals and
nongovernmental groups.' °
From a domestic law point of view, however, the principal bases
for tort liability lie in a set of possible negligences-or even strict
liabilities-that might be taxed to various actors. These include private
providers of security, whose alleged carelessness in hiring and carrying
out their duties would appear to present a prima facie case of negligence.
Those front-line negligent tortfeasors, however, are likely to be unsuable
for anything like the amounts at stake.
More practical potential defendants are the airlines, who contracted
with the security organizations, and who had independent
responsibilities of care to their passengers and to others who would
prove to be in harm's way. The carriers at least have much more
capacious pockets than the security firms. They are also the beneficiaries
of the immunity provided by the waiver requirements the statute
imposes on those who take advantage of the compensation system
established for the victims of the attacks."
Another group of private parties that might be defendants is the
makers of the airplanes, who could be alleged to have provided
inadequate security for the flight deck. Finally, a possible defendant is
the Government, whose agents possessed fragments of information that,
in retrospect, could be taken to generate duties to prevent these deadly
acts, with the variety of risks they presented to many interests.
I set against this background of legal theory a few personal
anecdotes that have policy relevance to a day -on which Americans will
always remember where they were when they heard the news. As
members of my law school community gathered in the school atrium
9. See, e.g., The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1994 &
Supp.) (providing for damage actions "against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or
damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or
omission of that foreign state" or its officials or employees).
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2000) (stating that "[a]ny national of the United States injured in
his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her
estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States").
11. See Air Safety Act, supranote 3, § 405(c)(3)(B)(i).
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during the first hours after the attacks, I encountered a woman who I
recognized as a member of the torts class that had just begun for the
term. We chatted briefly about the possible effects of the events on civil
liberties. The next morning I encountered her again and she mentioned
that she had been acquainted with a young man who had been a leader of
the passengers' heroic stand against the hijackers on the Pennsylvania
flight. That morning I also received an e-mail from another member of
the class who told me that he would not be in class for some days
because he had gone to New York City to see his orthodontist, and could
not get a return flight. He reported that his plane had landed at La
Guardia airport at precisely 9:00 a.m. just as the attacks were in
progress.
A fellow synagogue member of one of my sons, who lives in
Northern Virginia, crawled from the wreckage of the Pentagon. A friend
and former professional colleague of my other son, who lives in Illinois,
was the recently appointed director of the New York Port Authority. He
did not escape from his office in the eyrie of one of the Twin Towers. I
record these stories purely as illustrations of the radiations of these
events throughout the polity--examples of how in a dreadfully
fortuitous way they tended, at least pro tem, to make that fragmented
collection of a quarter billion people into a community.

III. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Congress' response focused on those who died or were physically
injured by the attacks. 2 The legislation setting up the Fund 3 provides a
virtual textbook of leading issues in contemporary injury law:
It establishes a nontort alternative for "any individual (or relatives
of a deceased individual) who was physically injured or killed as a
result" of the attacks. 4 This alternative is a specialized compensation
system under the administration of the Special Master. 5
"[T]he Special Master shall not consider negligence or any other
include amounts for punitive
theory of liability,"' 6 and "may not
17
damages in any compensation paid.'
A remarkable subsection declares that "the amount of compensation
to which the claimant is entitled" shall be "based on the harm to the
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See id. §403.
See id. §§ 401-409.
Id. § 403.
See id. §404.
Id. § 405(b)(2).
Id. § 405(b)(5).
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claimant, the facts of the claim, and the individual circumstances of the
claimant."' s
"The Special Master shall reduce the amount of compensation ...
by the amount of the collateral source compensation the claimant has
received or is entitled to receive .... 19
Collateral sources to be deducted from payments under the program
include "life insurance, pension funds, death benefit programs, and
payments by Federal, State, or local governments related to" the
attacks. 0
The waiver of the right to file civil actions for those who submit
claims under the Fund "does not apply to ... civil action[s] to recover
collateral source obligations.'
A claimant who submits a claim for compensation "waives the right
to file a civil action ... for damages sustained as a result of' the
attacks.2
For those who elect to sue carriers, there will be "a Federal cause of
action" that "shall be the exclusive remedy for damages arising out of'
the attacks,2- and the liability of the carriers for both compensatory and
punitive damages "shall not be in an amount greater than the limits of
the liability coverage maintained by the air carrier.""
With a swiftness matched to the occasion, the Department of
Justice in consultation with the Special Master, who was appointed on
November 26, 2001, moved to establish a detailed set of rules for the
administration of the Fund. The rules, originally promulgated in the
form of an Interim Final Rule on December 21, 2001,'5 include the
following provisions as augmented in the Final Rule published on March
13, 2002:26
"Eligible claimants" include those present at the attack sites "at the
time of or in the immediate aftermath of the crashes ... who suffered

18. Id. § 405(b)(1)(B)(ii).
19. Id. § 405(b)(6).
20. Id. §§ 405(b)(6), 402(4).
21. Id. § 405(c)(3)(B)(i).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 408(b)(1).
24. Id. § 408(a).
25. See Interim Final Rule, September 1 Ith Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg.
66,282 (Dec. 21, 2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104) [hereinafter Interim Rule]. Unless
otherwise indicated, all subsequent citations are to this Interim Final Rule.
26. See Final Rule, September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233
(Mar. 13, 2002) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104) [hereinafter Final Rule].
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physical harm" and the personal representatives of those2 7who died on
any of the four hijacked planes or at any of the attack sites.
The Special Master "shall take into consideration" "individual
circumstances" that "may include the financial needs or financial
resources of the claimant or the victim's dependents and beneficiaries. '28
Before the deduction of collateral sources, no compensation award
could be "less than $500,000" where a decedent had a spouse or
dependent or $300,000 in the case of a decedent "who was single with
no dependents. 29
In the case of decedents "who did not have any prior earned
income, or who worked only part time outside the home," economic loss
"with reference to replacement services and similar
could be calculated
30
measures."
"The presumed non-economic losses for decedents" would be
"$250,000 plus an additional $100,000 for the spouse and each
dependent of the deceased victim."3
"[T]he United States shall be subrogated to all potential claims
against third party
tortfeasors of any victim receiving compensation
32
from the Fund.
IV.

PROBLEMS IN ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION

The statute and the rules, drafted under the pressure of public
outrage at the events and compassion for the plight of the survivors,
generated some difficult problems in practical administration as well as
public relations. As the New Year dawned, there were reports about the
reluctance of potentially eligible people to sign on as beneficiaries of the
Fund. 33 Television news clips captured the discomfort of the Special
Master, the very able and experienced Washington lawyer Kenneth
Feinberg, as he faced emotional criticisms by survivors. 4 The survivors
complained of such features of the Fund as the $250,000 cap on
noneconomic damages." A New York City police officer whose wife
died in the attacks told Mr. Feinberg at a meeting with victims, "'I feel
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
23, 2002,

Interim Rule, supra note 25, §§ 104.2(a)(1)-(3). at 66 Fed. Reg. 66,282.
Id. § 104.41, at 66 Fed. Reg. 66,286.
Id.
Id. § 104.43(c).
Final Rule, supra note 26, § 104.44, at 66 Fed. Reg 11,246.
Interim Rule, supranote 25, § 104.63, at 66 Fed. Reg. 66,287.
See, e.g., Evening News (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 18, 2002).
See, e.g., Good Morning America (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 22, 2002).
See Milo Geyelin, Criticismof Sept. 11 Victims' Fund Sparks Backlash, WALL ST. J., Jan.
at B 1.
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your offer spits on my wife, my mother-in-law and my father-in-law,"'
saying36that he had to watch his in-laws "'pop pills just to get through the
day."
At the same time, criticism mounted from those vexed with what
they considered the avarice of the victims' families. One viewer wrote
an officer of a victim advocacy group, "'[i]f $1.6 million isn't enough
for you, then I hope you rot in hell.' 37 Another letter writer said, "'[w]e
feel your grief, really,"' but "'I'm just wondering if we have to feel your
greed, too."' 38 A particularly graphic example of the almost tawdry
mediaizing of the issue was a full color picture that occupied most of the
front page of the Chicago Sun-Times.39 The photograph was of sixteen
women, pregnant on September 11, whose husbands died in the attacks. 0
These widows, most of them smiling broadly with their infants in their
arms, appeared surrounding a radiantly smiling Diane Sawyer, anchor
person for ABC." A Chicago computer consultant, interviewed by a
reporter on State Street, declared that "'a little bit of this is becoming a
money grab .... How you die and when you die is somehow becoming
worth more money. I don't think we're
giving $1.6 million to the
' 2
families of soldiers killed in Afghanistan. "
Even within the narrow topic addressed here, Osama bin Laden had
created a problem for Solomon. Indeed, it was one that went far beyond
deciding what to do with one baby in a controversy between two
women. It required a consideration of the traditional rationales of tort
law, of the bases for fashioning specialized compensation systems, and
of the overarching problem of how society should respond to
misfortunes generally.
V. THE GOALS OF LAW AND POLICY
When we analyze policy questions both molar and molecular,41 our
scholarly traditions teach us to look for the major premise. What are the
goals of law and policy in determining society's responses to the attacks
of September 11? One orthodox form of analysis indicates that a

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Victims' FamiliesFace Backlash, CH. SuN-TIMEs, Jan. 24,2002, at 1.
See id.
Seeid.
Art Golab, Victims Fund Raises Ire: Backlash Hits Victims' Kin, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, Jan.

24,2002, at 18.
43.

The dichotomy is Holmes', in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,221 (1917).
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principal goal of injury law is the control of behavior that creates risks."4
Interestingly, the deterrence function indirectly provided by the statute
requires initiation by claimants who elect to bring private actions. If one
assumes that allowing suits against carriers and their agents would lead
to efficient levels of risk-taking, the statute creates an intriguing wrinkle
on the usual criticism of the "negligence lottery." In this context,
whatever social dicing there is depends on the decisions of individual
claimants about whether to seek compensation from the Fund, or to
exercise their common law rights to sue the airlines.
It is relevant here to refer to the very first section of the overall
statute, which as noted is called the Air Transportation Safety and
System Stabilization Act, and of which Title I is labeled "Airline
Stabilization.",4' That section provides for federal compensation for air

carriers, implemented by the President, "in an aggregate amount equal to
$5,000,000,000 for ... direct losses incurred beginning on September

11, 2001, by air carriers as a result of any Federal ground stop order"
and subsequent orders of that sort.46 This amount also covers "the
incremental losses incurred beginning September 11, 2001, and ending
December 31, 2001, by air carriers as a direct result of such attacks." '7
Thus, typifying a public choice approach, Congress pays off the airlines
for their misfortunes as a result of the attack; under the same statutory
roof, it also leaves open a litigation avenue for injured persons and
survivors that presumably would have the incidental result of making the
airlines more careful.
The legislation manifests several specific purposes. But intuition
suggests that, fashioned in the emotional aftermath of the attacks, the
statute also reflects an unfocused desire to strike out against a
particularly awful set of life's misfortunes, events burdening the national
soul with a recognition that retribution is not available on behalf of the
victims-or the nation-in any tit-for-tat manner. The statute thus is
both a symbol of displaced vengeance and a marker of social
compassion. At the very outset of the Special Master's statement
attached to the Interim Final Rule for the Fund, he refers to the Fund as
"an unprecedented expression of compassion on the part of the
American people to the victims and their families devastated by the
horror and the tragedy of September 11."4
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See, e.g., JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 4-3-25.
See Air Safety Act, supra note 3.
Id. § 101(a)(2).
Id. § 101(a)(2)(B).
Interim Rule, supra note 25, at 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274.
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The use of law-any kind of law-as a deterrent is imprecise at
best.4 9 Because of that inexactitude, dependence on deterrence as the
centerpiece of tort rationales constantly runs the risks of both under- and
over-deterrence. Those difficulties find a close parallel within injury law
in problems of under- and over-compensation. In traditional analysis,
fairness of compensation is the other principal pillar of injury law
alongside deterrence. Suits against the carriers, in the view of some,
would provide some corrective justice in favor of the victims and
survivors. However, the enactment of the compensation legislation
obviously is aimed at fairness in the round-at a kind of distributive
justice in a situation where the concept of justice is multifaceted.
In theory, Congress might have begun the legislative process by
viewing itself as a think tank, dedicated to cogitating on the human toll
of the attacks in the broad context of how society allocates life's
burdens, including the burdens of death and injury, in general. However,
Congress did not have that meditative luxury. And even if it had, it
would have been sensitive to the problem of the Tsar; it would have
recognized that it is not at all likely that it will enact a fully articulated,
comprehensive compensation system for all kinds of misfortune.
Therefore, in deciding to allocate federal funds to the victims, Congress
made a pragmatic decision to carve out these particular events from all
the rest of life's misfortunes for which some remedy can be provided by
dollars. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the victim compensation part
of the statute "constitutes budget authority in advance of appropriations
Acts and represents the obligation of the Federal Government to provide
for the payment of amounts for compensation under this title."50
With respect to those who choose to take advantage of federal
funding and thus to waive any tort actions, Congress made a number of
rough-and-ready judgments. These judgments reflect many of the crosscurrents that run through our law of injuries, including the common law
of torts and the development of statutory compensation systems.
The decision to enact a no-fault system is one of the most important
of these choices. We should note the contrast between this no-fault
scheme and that of workers' compensation. Even at the time that the
states adopted the workers' compensation model to deal with the
49. Cf.Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949). In this opinion, which implicitly
emphasizes the limits of the formula in United States v. CarrollTowing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
Cir. 1947), Learned Hand notes the "illusory" nature of quantitative estimates of the factors most
often crucial to issues of negligence. See id.
I am grateful to Chris Montroy for calling this case to
my attention.
50. Air Safety Act, supra note 3, § 406(b).
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problem of industrial injuries, there was at least a real possibility of a
tort action against a known defendant, who was directly responsible for
the injuries in question. By comparison, any fault of potential domestic
defendants in the case of the attacks is a fault that derives only from the
crimes of third parties who are either dead or extremely elusive.
The decision to leave to claimants the choice of an assured
compensation payment from federal funds or the gamble of a torts suit is
not a unique one,5 ' although this surely is not the approach of the
workers' compensation model. Again, the comparison with that system
is interesting. Workers' compensation is, in the main, an exclusive
remedy, with its exclusivity justified on the basis of a well-known quid
pro quo: plaintiffs give up the tort action, tied as it is to the handicaps of
contributory negligence and assumption of risk, in exchange for a
relatively assured, but often less lucrative, payment. By comparison, the
Fund legislation offers legal consumerism in the hyper mode. Although
the suit against the carriers is an exclusive remedy within the category of
civil actions, it is only one of two full alternative remedies. 2 Wildly
differing metaphors may apply: the consumer gets to play one of two
games available in the casino-or gets to pick from either of two
sections of the supermarket. These crass presentations of the issue
simply underline the leeway to indirectly influence the choice of social
policy that Congress has given to potential claimants.
In addition to the straight subsidy provided the airlines for both
direct and incremental losses,53 and the compelled waiver of civil actions
imposed on those who elect compensation from the Fund,54 the carriers
received yet another benefit from the Fund section of the legislation.
This is the provision on liability actions that caps "liability for all claims,
whether for compensatory or punitive damages" at the "limits of the
liability coverage maintained by the air carrier." 5 That provision is an
anomaly where traditional tort law is concerned. In fact, it is a very
different kind of cap than those that typically appear in tort-reform
legislation and proposals, which focus on damage amounts for
noneconomic losses and punitive damages. Those types of caps
essentially define, if arbitrarily, what losses are. By comparison, the

51. See, e.g., Allison v. Merck & Co., 878 P.2d 948, 960-61 (Nev. 1994) (holding no
preemption of suit for vaccine-caused injuries by National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986.
42 U.S.C. 300aa-I 1-15 (Supp. 1992)).
52. See supratext accompanying notes 14-15.
53. See Air Safety Act, supra note 3, § 101(a)(2)(A)-(B).
54. See id. § 405(c)(3)(B)(i).
55. Id. § 408(a).
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Fund legislation implicitly acknowledges that legally recognized losses
may be greater than insurance coverage but makes a public choice that
constitutes a direct subsidy.
The usual stance of tort law, in harsh current slang, has been that
entities that are careless on a large scale "deserve to die." Illustrative are
the bankruptcies of many asbestos companies as well as of the maker of
the Dalkon Shield. But for a variety of policy reasons, Congress in this
statute enacted the view that the airlines deserved to live even if they
were careless; indeed, it in effect said that they must live, for the health
of the nation.
Another interesting feature of the Fund legislation is the breadth of
its definition of the collateral sources that must be deducted from
payments by the Fund.56 Particularly striking is the inclusion of life
insurance in the definition of deductible collateral sources, a choice that
goes beyond traditional definitions of such payments.57 Giving especially
sharp point to Congress' decision to deduct collateral sources and to
deduct them so broadly-as well as its apparent premise for doing sois the Special Master's explication of the definition of economic loss."
There, he paraphrases the rules as mandating that his "schedules, tables,
or charts should identify presumed determinations of economic loss up
to a salary level commensurate with the 98th percentile of individual
income in the United States."' 9 He comments that "any methodology that
does nothing more than attempt to replicate a theoretically possible
future income stream would lead to awards that would be insufficient
relative to the needs of some victims' families, and excessive relative to
the needs of others."' He also notes specifically that the requirement in
the Act that he
consider "the individual circumstances of the claimant" indicates that
the Special Master may consider a particular claimant's financial needs
and resources, just as the Department [of Justice] and the Special
Master considered the needs of the claimants in concluding that no
claimant bringing a claim on behalf of a deceased victim should
receive less than $500,000 or $300,000 before collateral source
offsets.61

56.
57.
58.
Master).
59.
60.
61.

See Air Safety Act, supranote 3, § 402(4).
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 920A cmt. c (1977).
See Interim Rule, supranote 25, at 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274, 66,278 (Statement by the Special
Id. at 66 Fed. Reg. 66,278.
Id.
Id.
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Congress, the rules, and the Special Master thus all accept the
proposition that social fairness requires taking need into account. But
need is defined, in true capitalist style, as related closely to income
levels. Illustratively, before collateral offsets the payments to survivors
of a married victim who died at thirty-five with two dependent children
would total $809,426 if he was earning $10,000, but would be
$4,542,828 if he was earning $225,000.62 For a single decedent who was

thirty-five and earning $10,000 when she died, the payments-again
before collateral offset-would be $325,946 but they would be
$2,523,762 for someone earning $225,000.63
These raw numbers are excellent examples of the reasons for the
vexation of critical legal scholars about the inegalitarian nature of tort
damages.64 However, the rules do make a small bow to feminist analysis
in providing that for nonearners, the Special Master may consider
"replacement services and similar measures." 65 The bow is a restrained
one because at least in their terms, the rules do not take into account the
opportunity cost of homemakers who would net more money by putting
their children in day care while they more fully realize their earnings
potential. 66
The rules make a clear set of choices about the dollar value of
feelings and of life generally. Perhaps the most interesting of these is the
presumption of a $250,000 value for the noneconomic loss of decedents
and an additional $100,000 for that of spouses and each dependent.
Those familiar with the cases involving pre-impact fear of persons killed
in air crashes will understand that this appears to be exceptionally
generous with respect to the awful final moments of the decedents.0 By
contrast, the rules seem relatively stingy with respect to the affective
losses of survivors. These arbitrary choices simply illustrate the
incoherency-perhaps the necessary incoherency-of our theories of
62. See Presumed Loss Calculation Tables Before Any Collateral Offsets, Revised on August
27, 2002, at 12 ("Presumed Economic and Non-Economic Loss for a Married Decedent with 2
Dependent Children (Ages Newbom and 9 at Date of Death of Victim) Before Any Collateral
Offset"), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/vc-matrices.pdf (last modified
Aug. 27, 2002).
63. See id. at 14 ("Presumed Economic and Non-Economic Loss for a Single Decedent
Before Any Collateral Offset").
64. See, e.g., Richard Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 799 (1990) (saying
that "[tiort damages deliberately reproduce the existing distribution of wealth and income").
65. Interim Rule, supra note 25, § 104.43, 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,286.
66. I am grateful to Martha Chamallas for remarks that led to this observation.
67. See Final Rule, supranote 26, § 104.44, at 66 Fed. Reg. 11246.
68. See, e.g., Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 746 F.2d 311, 317-18 (5th Cir. 1984)
(affirming $15,000 award "for no more than four to six seconds of... anguish").
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tort damages, especially damages for intangibles. Underlining the
difficulty of quantifying affective relationships in precise dollar amounts
is the change of the awards for spouses and dependents from $50,000 in
the Interim Final Rule to $100,000 in the Final Rule. 9 The explanation is
laconic, as it almost had to be: "After reviewing the public comments
and meeting with numerous families of victims, we have decided to
double [the $50,000] amount to $100,000 for the spouse and each
dependent."7"
Related benchmarks are the overall compensation minimums of
$500,000 for decedents with spouses or dependents and $300,000 for
single decedents with no dependents. 7' These are themselves arbitrary
figures that could be criticized as too low-few would have the temerity
to say that they are too high. What is significant is that they appear to
codify a general belief that for a variety of reasons, stated and mostly
unstated, the existence of a life itself has financial value. It is interesting
in this connection that Congress, perhaps casually, specifically included
the currently controversial concept of "hedonic damages" in the
definition of "noneconomic losses. 72
It is worth noting, at least incidentally, that the statutory references
to those eligible for compensation do not appear to be rigorously logical.
One may compare, in this regard, the statement of Congressional
purpose "to provide compensation to any individual (or relatives of a
deceased individual) who was physically injured or killed" in the
attacks73 with the definition of the category of eligible individuals as
including "the personal representative of the decedent who files a claim
on behalf of the decedent." 74 There appears to be a mixture here of
traditional concepts of wrongful death and survival, but this is surely not
unique in our existing state law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Fund legislation, and the losses that generated it, house many
of the central arguments about how society should deal with injuries. In
particular, they raise in a very emotional context the cross-equity
problem among all kinds of injuries and misfortune more generally.
69. CompareFinal Rule, supranote 26, § 104.44, at 67 Fed. Reg. 11,246, with Interim Rule,
supra note 25, at 66 Fed. Reg. 66,286.
70. Final Rule, supranote 26, at 67 Fed. Reg. 11,239.
71. See Interim Rule, supranote 25, § 104.41, at 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274.
72. Air Safety Act, supranote 3, § 402(7).
73. Id. § 403.
74. Id. § 405(c)(2)(C).
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From a social point of view, how do we distinguish the deserts of those
who slip in the bathtub from those injured in the "second collision" of an
allegedly uncrashworthy automobile? More relevantly, how do we
distinguish those individuals from the firemen who were headed up into
the Twin Towers as everyone else was coming down, and American
soldiers who die from either hostile or friendly fire in Afghanistan-or
Iraq?
Tort law provides only interstitial answers, and those only to the
first pairing of victims, and Congress, as we have noted, is not likely to
provide a comprehensive solution that encompasses all the cases. With
no Tsar to place the issues in a general framework and settle them
globally, the equity profile of compensation is a jagged one. On this
battleground, symbolic disputants are the man who claims that a cap of a
quarter of a million dollars on the intangible losses associated with the
death of his wife spits on her memory and the person who accuses
survivors of greed. And that battleground is political.
In creating the Fund, Congress tried to broker the politics of injury.
What are we to make of this legislative patchwork, hastily constructed
with the noblest intentions? Unlike the thoroughgoing New Zealand
scheme, the Fund legislation carves out a narrow wedge of misfortune.
Limited as it is to the relief of victims of events occurring in just three
places on a single morning, the statute even contrasts with the workers'
compensation laws and the varied no-fault statutes for motor vehicle
accidents. All of those statutes embrace injuries that occur every day
throughout their jurisdictions.
There will be many different interpretations of why, out of the
broad spectrum of possible responses, Congress chose to create this
Fund with its distinct provisions. Surely some of the distinguishing
features of September 11 that led our national legislature to this solution
include the unique occasion of an attack on the continental United States
that caused thousands of deaths and the repetitively-broadcast television
images of the events. Even the instigating cave-dwellers of Afghanistan
saw-as we all did-the crashes, the fire, and the smoke as they rolled
along miles of videotape.
Let me compare the day of the attack on Pearl Harbor, at the edge
of my memories of boyhood. Without plumbing the comparative impact
of print, radio, and television, I think that we can say that the events of
September 11 turned out to be a quintessential television occasion. That
would have been so even if those events had not been made for
television, although it appears that in a very real sense their diabolical
instigators planned them that way. By comparison, Americans who saw
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films of the attack on Pearl Harbor saw them, if at all, in newsreels in
theaters. And at the time, Hawaii was not a state and in any event was
2500 miles away from the country as it then was constituted. The attack
on the continental United States in 2001 aroused many feelings, but one
response that stands out and is manifested in the Fund legislation-and
is further magnified by the subsequent anthrax cases-is a new sense of
national vulnerability.
All of this has led to a unique form of public choice. The legislation
has something for everyone, in response to a most tragic set of
circumstances. It specifically pays off the airlines, it limits their liability
in any event, it offers them a potential immunity-remarkably, one
conferrable by choices made by victims and survivors-and it funds a
wide range of losses for those victims and survivors from the general
revenues.
Finally, it provides a certain balm for us all, in our continuing
horror at the events, our collective compassion for the victims, and our
increased sense of vulnerability. The film clips and reports of the
discussions that a sometimes beleaguered Special Master has had with
the survivors present a continuing drama that would be as familiar to
Tocqueville as to devotees of soap operas. After the accelerated
fashioning and passage of the statute, and the speedy drafting of the
rules with the Special Master's explication, we are only in an
intermediate stage of that drama. Now we appear to be witnessing a
nationwide community conversation about the limits of compassion, the
sharing of burdens, and even the vices of greed and envy.
A byproduct of the Fund statute is its teaching about the limits of
traditional economic analysis. Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of
the Fund legislation is its most obvious feature: the commitment of
federal money for the relief of victims of what was not only perceived
domestically as an attack on us all, but was intended in that way.
Churchill, perhaps the greatest figure of the twentieth century in
light of his combined accomplishments, captured the core of the
situation with his characteristic eloquence, concision and humanity. In
his war memoirs, he describes how his insistence on a national insurance
scheme for bomb damage arose from his view of a demolished
restaurant in Margate:
The proprietor, his wife, and the cooks and waitresses were in tears.
Where was their home? Where was their livelihood? Here is a
privilege of power. I formed an immediate resolve .... I dictated a
letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer laying down the principle that
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all damage from the fire of the enemy must be a charge upon the State
and compensation be paid in full and at once.75
Churchill observed that it was essential to the political success of
this scheme that the public and Parliament were willing "to separate
damage resulting from the fire of the enemy from all other forms of war
lOSS., ' 76 He added, "'it would be a very solid mark of the confidence
which after some experience we are justified in feeling about the way in
which we are going to come through this war." 77
There are, of course, differences in both the events and the
responses. But as a general description of the politics and the policy of
this specialized jurisprudence of injury, the words of the master are
resonant. The Fund forges a linkage, one beyond the graphs of
microeconomic theory, among tens of millions of souls. Besides the
survivors, those include-only illustratively-my student with her
acquaintance on the Pennsylvania plane, my student with the
orthodontist's appointment in New York, my sons and their friends and
colleagues, living and dead.

75. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THEIR FINEST HOUR 349 (1949).
76. Id. at 350.
77. Id.
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